The visit of Mr. Eric Chu, the chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Taiwan Nationalist Party, to the United States will have a significant political impact not only on the relationship between the Kuomintang and the United States, but also on the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland.
On June 2, when he embarked on his first day of his trip to the United States, he visited the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and was optimistic about KMT’s performance in county and mayoral elections until November 2022, and was nominated by KMT. Said. Its “best candidate” to win the 2024 presidential election. He emphasized that the Kuomintang had a close relationship with the United States and had a long-standing position of “resisting communism” for 100 years. Mr. Chu argued that the Kuomintang’s priority was to “protect the Republic of China (ROC)” and “put Taiwan’s defense first.”
At Stanford University, Chu is a political scientist, Larry Diamond, an Indo-Pacific expert, Orville Shell, a geopolitical expert, Michael Austin, a retired general, James O. Ellis, and a historian, Glenn. It is worth noting that I met American experts such as Tiffert, columnist Marcos Kounarakis, and artificial intelligence researcher James. Timby, nuclear policy expert David Fedor, international affairs expert Erin Ashley Vagot, and political science candidate Jason Mian Luo.
At a banquet with foreign Taiwanese in Washington on June 5, Eric Chu said that describing the party as “anti-American” and “betraying Taiwan” undermined the image of the Kuomintang. Mr. Chu hopes that the Kuomintang candidate running for the next Taiwanese presidential election will establish a communication channel with the United States, adding that such a channel has nothing to do with himself. Mr. Chu suggested that he would not run for the internal election of the Kuomintang presidential candidate.
On June 6, Chu made a speech at the Brookings Institution, emphasizing that Taiwan could be a “stabilizer of the international order,” a “defender of democracy,” and a “bridge between east and west.” But Mr. Chu didn’t elaborate on how the Kuomintang could serve as a “bridge” between the United States and mainland China. He said KMT is “pro-US,” “pro-peace,” and “pro-democracy.” According to Chu, ideologically, Taiwan shares liberal values ​​with the United States. In this way, Taiwan can not only help the West understand mainland China, but also promote openness and cultural interaction between China, the West, Japan and Southeast Asia.
In a dialogue with US participants, Mr. Chu said the reopening of KMT’s office in the US “partially” reflects the Taiwanese view of the US side. His comments at the Brookings Institute on June 6 are the same as his remarks at Stanford University on June 2, and the Kuomintang office was opened by Americans without monopolizing Taiwan’s public opinion. He said he would be able to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the Taiwanese people’s perspective. By a small number of people or a particular political party. By implication, Chu is a Taiwanese society with US government and Chinese experts without the Washington Nationalist Office listening to the dominant views clarified by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its representatives. Emphasized to make available a broader view of. In the United States.
The most provocative statement made by Eric Chu during his visit to the United States was a comment on the consensus between mainland China and the Kuomintang in 1992. In other words, there is only one China, but the interpretation of “one China” was left to both sides. Surprisingly, Chu called the 1992 consensus a “non-consensus consensus,” and added that such a consensus was a kind of “creative ambiguity.”
The term “non-consensus” evoked an immediate reaction from the DPP side and mainland China commentators. The DPP responded swiftly to Chu’s remarks on June 7, saying that the 1992 consensus did not actually give the Taiwanese side “ambiguous” space. The DPP criticized Eric Chu’s Kuomintang for “ignoring international affairs” without any help or dignity to protect Taiwan’s national security and dignity.Liberty Times, June 7, 2022). The DPP claimed on June 2 that the Mainland Affairs Council released findings showing that “more than 80% of Taiwanese people do not agree with the 1992 consensus.”
Mainland commentator, Hu Xijin, Global Times,He criticized KMT for becoming a “small DPP” and a “bubble.” Many people in mainland China who heard that the 1992 chairman of the Kuomintang was “very uncomfortable” because the 1992 chairman of the Kuomintang retreated compared to the time of former President Ma Ying-jeou. Said. Hu added that Taiwan’s public pressure and US attitude have weakened the Kuomintang more than ever.
President Hu wrote: “Of course, I hate the regressive attitude of the Kuomintang, but it doesn’t make sense to anger and scold the Kuomintang, the 100-year-old Kuomintang. On the mainland, the political atmosphere of the island is” Taiwan independence. ” We can only rely on actions to influence the island so that it cannot be hijacked by forces and that the living space in one China’s defense continues to expand (“Ming Pao, June 9, 2022, p. A14). “
On June 9, Ma Xiaoguang, a spokesman for the Taiwan Secretariat, was asked by a reporter about his reaction to Eric Chu’s comments on the 1992 consensus. Mr. Ma said that the 1992 consensus should not be “distorted”, and the consensus between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party that “maintain one China principle and pursue national unity” is “clearly in black and white.” It is written “(see website), Taiwan Affairs Office, www.gwytb.gov.cn, June 9, 2022). The response from Ma showed that the official view of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was clear in the 1992 consensus.
Coincidentally, on June 7, the former chairman of KMT Hung Hsiu-chu visited Beijing. Mr. Hang said that Taiwanese and Chinese throughout the mainland should not intervene in “hegemonic power”, the DPP is not aware of the 1992 consensus, and Taiwan has experienced a “de-Sinicization” process. Many, and next-generation Taiwanese, will have an identity away from the mainland (Sing Tao Daily, June 7, 2022).
Mr. Chu’s visit to the United States has a great political impact. First, regarding the relationship between KMT and the United States, the increasingly politically weakened KMT has rebuilt its office in Washington, allowing U.S. politicians and government officials to gain a unified view. ..
Second, the Kuomintang is politically divided into dark blue and light blue camps, with the azure camp where Hung Hsiu-chu is a minority and the light blue camp where Eric Chu is the dominant force.
The light blue camp is, of course, not very well-positioned to the 1992 consensus because of Taiwan’s political market and public opinion. Nevertheless, it is not yet known if KMT’s rejuvenation can succeed under the leadership of Eric Chu, and if it will succeed.
Chu is reportedly trying to take care of Wayne Chen Wang An as a candidate to run for the Taipei mayoral election. If Chen can win the election, he will be groomed as a rising star of the Kuomintang, like Ma Ying-jeou, who was elected Mayor of Taipei in 1998. He will be the mayor of New Taipei in 2024 as a presidential candidate for the Kuomintang. It is not yet known whether Eric Chu will succeed in reviving, reorganizing and revitalizing the Kuomintang by grooming Hou You-Yi and Chen. But there is one thing that is clear. Chu’s remarks on the 1992 consensus show that the light blue camp is cautious about explicitly avoiding the image of “pro-China.”
Ideally, the light blue camp of the Kuomintang, led by Eric Chu, is a clear bridge between the United States and mainland China, while being a stable person who can interact with mainland China and effectively compete with the controlling DPP. You can draw an image. On the other hand, in the election market. The integration of KMT’s bridging capabilities could strengthen the outlook for Taiwan’s elections, as most people in Taiwan prefer to witness stable cross-strait relations.
In conclusion, Eric Chu’s visit to the United States and his remarks have important political implications for Kuomintang-US relations and cross-strait relations. American politicians and officials can listen to the views and views of Taiwan’s Reunification Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the light blue camp led by Eric Chu can be regarded as a “soft” unification promotion force, showing a firmer attitude toward the 1992 consensus than the azure camp represented by Hung Hsiu-chu and Chang Ya-chung. Not. A person who can be regarded as a “hard” unification promotion force within the Kuomintang. The light blue camp is likely to remain cautious about attitudes and policies towards China in the upcoming county and mayoral elections. Still, if the Kuomintang factions can unite in an attitude about how the party’s bridging functions can be integrated and clarified, cross-strait relations, and even US-China relations, in 2024. It will open a potential breakthrough in the years leading up to the presidential election.
